It turns out that under certain conditions, circumstances whose precise character cannot be known, Netanyahu is capable of acting in complete variance with his principles and the things he believes.
Discussions about a gesture to strengthen the Palestinian Authority in response to Hamas' achievement in the Shalit deal expose the non-serious conduct of Israel's governments. Can it be that during five years of debate nobody took the time to think about this issue, to prepare for it and perhaps even take a resolute step to enact a decision in good time?
Of course, it may be that it is not a lack of thought but rather a deliberate forethought. What motivated Benjamin Netanyahu to carry out the deal here and now is the desire to punish Mahmoud Abbas for his maneuvers at the United Nations, and to strengthen Hamas, which more seriously plays the role of "non-partner."
This is one explanation as to why Netanyahu carried out the deal right now; there are also interpretations involving a desire to "clear the table" while preparing for an attack on Iran, a need to reinforce the prime minister's position, and a need to respond to popular discontent reflected recently in the protest movement and strikes. All such interpretations are logical and cogent; yet they are all speculative. It's impossible to know what triggered Netanyahu's psychological change, and led him to put his signature to a document and turn what was considered an inconceivable deal into a done deal. After all, we are talking about a deal that was on the table for at least three years. This is a deal which he opposed verbally and in writing, and it is a deal that his "natural political partners" also oppose - and yet one day he decided to just do it.
A categorical answer to the question "why" cannot be found since the prime minister did not provide one. Netanyahu never explained what caused him to change his principled stance, and what turned a rank capitulation to terror into a viable possibility; what set the stage for the freeing of 1,000 terrorists, and what suddenly made Gilad Shalit's freedom worth the price.
This lack of an explanation is particularly conspicuous in view of the lavish detail Netanyahu furnished in his earlier perorations about the danger of capitulating to terror, and about his refusal to negotiate with Hamas. Why he doesn't do things is well known to us; why he acts remains a mystery. Clearly, such conduct is exasperating. This deal could have been signed at least three years ago, thus sparing a significant amount of suffering and damage to Shalit and to Israeli society at large.
But there is a bright side: It turns out that under certain conditions, circumstances whose precise character cannot be known, Netanyahu is capable of acting in complete variance with his principles and the things he believes. He does this while marketing his decision as a fantastic one, without explanations. "Netanyahu is proving, not for the first time, that he is more of a pragmatist than an ideologue," wrote Yossi Verter the day the deal was announced. That is to say, perhaps the same dynamic will be repeated in a peace agreement with the Palestinians.
It may very well be that the day will come, and circumstances whose character will remain opaque to us will consolidate in his mind, and cause Netanyahu to reach a leadership decision, one which will force him to lose sleep and bear the burden of the great responsibility on his shoulders, and which will culminate in a peace deal with the Palestinians. The selfsame deal that in one form or another has been on many tables for many years will suddenly turn into the "best agreement that can be attained," or "the inheritance of past governments that cannot be avoided." Netanyahu will issue the same declaration that he made when he voted in favor of the disengagement from Gaza, saying that the deal promises "a future and security to the vast majority of Israelis."
It may very well be that the day will come and we will read that a peace agreement has been signed with the Palestinians. The cabinet will convene for a secret night session, Ehud Barak will praise Netanyahu for taking his advise, Limor Livnat will recall her vote on the Gaza pullout which she made with a "heavy heart," Shalom Simhon will confess that in the past it was hard for him but now his anxiety has lessened, and Avigdor Lieberman, Uzi Landau and Moshe Ya'alon will vote against it.
That is the optimistic conclusion that I draw from the Shalit deal. When this Palestinian deal comes, volumes of words will be written about why the agreement has come when it has come, and much ink will be spilled in regret at the deal not being signed years earlier, and how it could have been signed much earlier in a fashion that would have saved lives, suffering, hate and money - and then too it will be better late than never.
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